Ochoa v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County: New Grounds or Old Guidelines? by Dutton, Sharon Clyde
Masthead Logo McGeorge Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 3 Article 13
1-1-1986
Ochoa v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County:
New Grounds or Old Guidelines?
Sharon Clyde Dutton
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sharon C. Dutton, Ochoa v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County: New Grounds or Old Guidelines?, 17 Pac. L. J. 1027 (1986).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol17/iss3/13
Ochoa v. Superior Court of
Santa Clara County: New Grounds or
Old Guidelines?
In Ochoa v. Superior Court of Santa Clara' the California Supreme
Court considered the application of Dillon v. Legg' in an action
brought by a bystander mother for negligent infliction of mental
distress. The court rejected the narrow requirement that the shock
arise from an observation of a brief and sudden occurrence causing
injury to another,3 or in other words, the need for temporal proximity.'
Instead, the court held that when the plaintiff observes defendant's
negligent conduct, and the injury to the victim, and has a contem-
poraneous awareness that defendant's conduct or lack of conduct caus-
ed the injury a cause of action is stated.' The Ochoa court acknowledg-
ed the problem of mechanical application of the Dillon factors,6 yet
chose another potentially arbitrary standard of replacement.' This Note
will discuss whether the relaxation of the Dillon factor of "temporal
proximity"' provides a solution to the problems created by the Dillon
decisions. 9
Part I of this Note sets forth the facts of Ochoa and summarizes
the majority and dissenting opinions. Part II presents the legal
background of the negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of
action for a bystander. Part III analyzes the negligent infliction of
emotional distress cause of action in light of the Dillon rule. In addi-
tion, Part III examines fundamental flaws that exist in both intended
and actual application of the Dillon decision. This Note concludes
that the recent interpretation of the Dillon rule by the court in Ochoa
fails to remedy those flaws.
1. 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985).
2. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
3. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 170, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, §54 at 366 (4th ed. 1971). The
"bystander proximity" doctrine holds that harm to a bystander is foreseeable if the bystander
has physical, temporal, and relational proximity to the victim and the accident. Id.
5. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 170, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
6. Id. at 178, 703 P.2d at 14, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (J. Grodin, concurring) ("...the
Dillon guidelines have proved troublesome to the lower courts...").
7. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
8. See in fra note 82 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 154-169 and accompanying text.
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I. THE CASE
A. The Facts
Thirteen-year-old Rudy Ochoa was in the custody of the Santa Clara
County juvenile hall for almost a month when he became ill with
an apparent cold.'" Rudy's parents visited him in the infirmary and
found him "extremely ill" and experiencing excruciating pain." Rudy's
mother expressed concern to the juvenile hall authorities that her son
was not receiving the necessary treatment but she was assured that
Rudy was well cared for.'2 The following day Mrs. Ochoa visited Rudy
and found that his conditon had worsened.' 3 Rudy appeared
dehydrated, his skin was clammy, and he appeared to be convulsing
and hallucinating during her visit.' 4 Mrs. Ochoa pleaded with the
authorities to allow Rudy to be seen by the family physician." She
even offered to take Rudy in handcuffs.' 6 The juvenile hail authorities
refused, insisting Rudy only had the flu and would be given a penicillin
shot by the attending physician at the hall." Mrs. Ochoa.continued
applying cold compresses to Rudy as he continued to scream in pain
and vomit.' 8 Rudy was not transferred to an intensive care unit, X-
rays were not taken, neither blood nor urine tests were performed.' 9
In the evening, Mrs. Ochoa was forced to leave Rudy despite his pleas
for her to remain. Rudy died the following morning of bilateral
pneumonia. 20
Mr. and Mrs. Ochoa sued Santa Clara County and four county
agents and employees, 2' alleging nine causes of action. 22 The trial court
sustained demurrers to all counts relating to negligent infliction of
10. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 162, 703 P.2d at 3, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
11. Id. at 163-64, 703 P.2d at 3-4, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 663-64.
12. Id. at 163, 703 P.2d at 3, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 164, 703 P.2d at 4, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Although the county had assumed that it was no longer in this action, the Ochoas
sought a writ of mandate directing the trial court to reverse its order sustaining the demurrers
of the county as well as the individual defendants. Id.
22. Plaintiffs asserted that they had stated causes of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The court held that plaintiffs had not pleaded arguments on the subject,
the plaintiffs having wrongly assumed that a cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress may be established on the same theory as that of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. Id. at 165.
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emotional distress.23 The Ochoas petitioned for a writ of mandate
to compel trial court to set aside the order.2 ' The California Supreme
Court issued the writ. 25
B. The Opinion
1. Majority Opinion
In Ochoa v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether a bystander may state a cause of action for
negligent infliction of mental distress, when the death is not the result
of a brief and sudden occurrence viewed contemporaneously by the
bystander. 26 The court relied upon the seminal case of Dillon v. Legg
which set forth three factors to be applied in determining whether
a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff who is a bystander based upon
foreseeability of risk. 27 The first factor is a consideration of the plain-
tiff's proximity to the accident. The second factor is whether the shock
resulted from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff resulting
from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident
or from learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. The
third factor to be considered is whether the plaintiff and the victim
were closely related. 2 The Ochoa court acknowledged the existence
of the first and third Dillon factors. With regard to the second Dillon
factor,29 however, the findings of the court revealed the injury to Rudy
was not the result of a sudden occurrence.3 0 Cases following Dillon,
but prior to Ochoa held that if the victim's death or injury was not
the result of sudden occurrence, no cause of action existed.' The
Ochoa court, however, did not feel constrained by prior precedent.
The court rejected the "sudden occurrence" element in the temporal
proximity requirement as an unwarranted restriction on the ability
of the plaintiff to recover.12
23. Id. at 164, 703 P.2d at 4, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 177, 703 P.2d at 13, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
26. Id. at 167, 703 P.2d at 6, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
27. Id. at 166, 703 P.2d at 5, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
28. Id.
29. See Annots., 5 A.L.R. 4th 833 (1981).
30. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 163-64, 703 P.2d at 3-4, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 663-64. Mrs. Ochoa
alleged that the defendant's negligent conduct was omission (i.e., failure to provide adequate
medical care for Rudy), rather than commission. Id.
31. See Jansen v. Children's Hospital Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr.
883 (1973); Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976);
Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122.
32. "Such a restriction arbitrarily limits liability when there is a high degree of foreseeability
of shock to the plaintiff and the shock flows from the abnormal event." Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d
1029
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The Ochoa court reasoned that the factors set forth in Dillon were
mere guidelines to be used in assessing whether the plaintiff was a
foreseeable victim of the defendant's negligence." Even though Rudy's
death did not result from a brief or sudden occurence, the defen-
dants could easily foresee that Mrs. Ochoa would be emotionally
distressed by their conduct." The test of foreseeable victim articulated
by the majority was satisfied by the witness observing the defendant's
conduct and the child's injury, with the contemporaneous awareness
that the defendant's conduct or lack thereof was causing the harm
to the child. These elements demonstrate that the defendants had a
duty to Mrs. Ochoa as a witness to their negligent acts" and therefore
Mrs. Ochoa should be permitted to recover. An additional factor in
the decision of the court was the public policy determination that
sudden occurrence restriction arbitrarily limits liability when a high
degree of foreseeability of shock to the plaintiff exists.16 Six justices
concurred in the majority opinion. Chief Justice Bird wrote a con-
curring and dissenting opinion.
2. Dissenting Opinion
In a separate concurring and dissenting opinion,37 Chief Justice Bird
expressed concern that the majority, while properly rejecting the "sud-
at 168, 703 P.2d at 7, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 667. California courts previously held that visual
perception of the impact causing death or injury is not required. See Krause v. Graham, 19
Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977) Plaintiff husband was sitting in his
parked car while his wife removed groceries from the trunk. The defendant's car approached
the plaintiff's car at high speed, killing plaintiff's wife. The cause of action was granted despite
plaintiff's not seeing his wife being struck. This demontrates that contemporaneous observance
of the immediate consequences of a negligent act may be sufficient to allow recovery. See
also Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1973), in which plain-
tiff's 13-year-old son sustained severe injuries as a result of a gunpowder explosion. The plain-
tiff did not hear or see the explosion but came upon the scene to aid her son immediately
after the explosion. Recovery for the mother's emotional distress was allowed. Id.
33. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 170, 703 P.2d at 7, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
34. Id. at 171, 703 P.2d at 9, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
35. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, §54 at 333. A defendant who can reasonably anticipate
any harm to the plaintiff owes a duty of care to that plaintiff. Id.
36. The Ochoa court also rejected the defendant's argument that Dillon should not apply
since Mrs. Ochoa was voluntarily present where she was likely to be upset by the defendant's
conduct. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 171, 703 P.2d at 9, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 669. See Justus v. Atchison,
19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977). In Justus, recovery was denied for
a father's distress resulting from witnessing the birth of a stillborn fetus. Id. Some courts have
read dictum in Justus to imply that recovery is precluded when the plaintiff is voluntarily at
the scene of the traumatic event. See, e.g., Cortez v. Marcias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 650,
167 Cal. Rptr. 905, 914; Austin v. Regents of University of California, 89 Cal. App. 3d 354,
361, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420, 427 (Jefferson, J., dissenting) (1979). See generally Nolan and Ursin,
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HAstNGs L.J.
583, 597 (1982).
37. Ochoa 39 Cal. 3d at 181-96, 703 P.2d at 16-27, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 676-87.
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den occurrence" requirement, replaced the requirement with another
arbitrary limitation. 8 As an alternative to the test proposed by the
majority, Chief Justice Bird urged the court to apply a test of
reasonable foreseeablity 9 Chief Justice Bird's proposed "reasonable
foreseeablity" test would conform the emotional distress area to other
areas of negligence law."0 Therefore even in the bystander situation,
the defendant owes a duty of care when that defendant can reasonably
foresee that serious emotional distress to the plaintiff could result from
the defendant's conduct. 4' Rather than limit liabitily through the
application of arbitrary elements, reasonable foreseeability would pro-
vide the limit.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Early Case Law: The Impact Rule
The common law did not allow recovery for mental distress arising
from negligent conduct.4" This rule was based upon the belief that
damages for emotional distress were too difficult to measure. 3 In
addition, case law reflected the belief that recovery for emotional
38. Id. at 190, 703 P.2d at 22, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 682 ("Liability should not hinge on
the observation of the defendant's wrongdoing.").
39. Id. at 190, 703 P.2d at 23, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 683. England and Hawaii have held
reasonable foreseeability is the appropriate test for determining a defendant's liability for negligent
infliction of mental distress. See McLoughlin v. O'Brian, 2 All Eng. Rep. 298 (1982). In
McLoughlin, plaintiff was told of injuries and death to members of her family resulting from
an auto accident, and was severely shocked upon seeing their injured condition at the hospital.
The court concluded that no policy considerations existed sufficient to justify limiting the liability
of tortfeasors who have caused reasonably foreseeable emotional distress to another. Id. See
also Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, Etc., 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1982). The
Campbell court upheld an award of damages for emotional distress suffered when plaintiff's
dog died as a result of defendant negligently transporting the dog to a private veterinarian
hospital. Id. The court indictated no requirement existed that the tortious event be witnessed
by the plaintiff. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). Dillon guidelines
should not bar recovery but only be indicative of the degree of mental distress suffered. Rodrigues
v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). Liability for negligent infliction of emotional
distress should be determined by the application of general tort principles. But see Kelly v.
Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975). Recovery was denied when
a grandfather suffered a fatal heart attack when informed that his daughter and granddaughter
had been killed in an auto accident in another state. The court required that plaintiff be within
a reasonable distance of the accident. Id.
40. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 191, 703 P.2d at 23, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 683. See generally Dia-
mond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and
Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTING L.J. 477, 504 (1984).
41. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, §54 at 333. Unlimited liability would be an unreasonable
burden on all human acts. Id.
42. See G. GREGORY, H. KAIvEN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 952
(3d. ed. 1977).
43. Leibeson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to
Another, 15 J. FMI. L. 163, 163 (1976-77) (".... there was no assurance that psychiatric supply
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distress would subject defendants to fraudulent claims from an
unlimited pool of potential plaintiffs." Other policy considerations
used to deny a cause of action included the difficulty of establishing
proximate cause and the fear of increased litigation.45
Gradually, however, the concerns that previously prevented recovery
for emotional distress weakened. By the turn of the century, courts
were allowing recovery for parasitic damages." Parasitic damages were
awarded when negligent conduct of the defendant caused an impact
on plaintiff's person resulting in physical injury." After proving im-
pact, a plaintiff could claim damages for both physical and emotional
injury.48 The impact requirement reflected the intention of the courts
to provide some verifiable guarantee of the validity of plaintiff's
claim. "9 If impact was substantial, the impact theory was defensible.
A plaintiff who suffered a serious physical injury could reasonably
be expected to experience emotional injury. In application, however,
courts permitted recovery for mental trauma even though physical
consequences were slight."0 The result was that damages for mental
distress could be awarded to the victim experiencing a minor impact,'
while the bystander who suffered severe emotional distress was denied
recovery." Many courts rejected the impact rule, recognizing that the
impact requirement did little to increase the guarantee of genuineness
of emotional injury." The frequent bending of the impact rule and
the discontent with the purported justifications for the rule, prompted
most juristictions to replace it with the zone of danger test. 4
had become sophisticated enough to satisfactorily establish a cause and effect relationship be-
tween the injury and the incident which allegedly gave rise to it.").
44. See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 175-85, 404 A.2d 672, 689-90 (1979) (Roberts, J.
dissenting).
45. See e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615-16, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422 (1969).
46. W. PROSSER, supra note 4 §54 at 330; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Distress in
the Law of Torts, 49 HAv m L. REv. 1033, 1049 (1936). The treatment of any element of
damages as a parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A
factor that is today recognized as parasitic will tomorrow be recognized as an independent
basis of liability. Id.
47. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d 738, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79; STREET, 1 FOUNDATIONS
OF LEAL LIABILITY 470 (1906); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §456, comment b (1965).
48. Dillion, 68 Cal.2d 238, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
49. See Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAs.. L. REv. 40, 41 (1956).
50. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, §54 at 331. Impact had meant a slight blow, a trifling
burn, a trivial jolt or jar, dust in the eye, or inhalation of smoke. Id.
51. See Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497, 504
(1922). "The magic formula 'impact' is pronounced; the door opens to the full joy of complete
recovery." Id.
52. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, §54 at 333.
53. Comment, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: California Expands Liability for
Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress, 33 HASTINGS L. J. 291, 294 (1981).
54. Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Accident Cases: The Expanding
1032
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B. Zone of Danger
California courts never accepted the impact rule,-- opting instead
for the zone of danger test.56 The impact rule was predicated on the
belief that mental distress could not be sustained without some physical
injury. 7 In contrast, the zone of danger test was based on the belief
that emotional injuries could not exist without the threat of physical
trauma. 8 Courts, unhappy with the impact rule, sought to expand
liability by allowing recovery to a plaintiff who was within an area
of potential physical harm at the time of the defendant's negligent
act. 9 A plaintiff could recover not only for injuries sustained as a
direct result of a physical impact but also for injuries sustained as
a result of emotional harm caused by the plaintiff's fear for personal
safety.60 Many jurisdictions, including California, justified the expan-
sion of liability on the grounds that since a defendant can reasonably
foresee the harm to a person within the zone of danger, a duty of
care arises. 6 '
In Amaya v. Home Fuel and Ice, Inc.,'62 the California Supreme
Court addressed the issue of the scope of the zone of danger test.
In Amaya, the plaintiff was a pregnant mother who witnessed the
death of her seventeen-month-old son when he was run over by a
truck negligently driven by the defendant. The court denied recovery,
noting that no American cases supported recovery for mental distress
arising solely from the fear for the safety of another.6 3 The court
Definition of Liability, I W. NEw ENG. L. R. 798 (1979). See also REsTATEmENT (SECOND)
TORTS, §436 (1966 & Supp. 1977) (listing states that still follow impact rule).
55. Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App. 2d. 581, 92 P.2d 434 (1939). Recovery was allowed
for "injury to the nervous system" arising from an automobile collision on plaintiff's land
which caused the plaintiff to fear for his own safety. Id. at 584, 92 P.2d at 436. Fright alone
is not an "injury" that may be the basis of a claim for damages, but physical injury due
to fright is compensable. Clough v. Steen, 3 Cal. App. 2d 392, 394, 39 P.2d 889, 890.
56. Cook, 33 Cal. App. 2d at 584, 92 P.2d at 436.
57. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
58. The zone of danger rule differs from the impact rule. Under the impact rule, defen-
dant's negligent act had to include a physical impact resulting in injury, while under the zone
of danger rule, recovery was allowed if the plaintiff could show a reasonable fear of the impact.
59. See Cook, 33 Cal. App. 2d at 584, 92 P.2d at 433. Impact is not necessary for recovery.
Id.
60. See Amaya v. Home Fuel and Ice, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr.
33 (1963).
61. Comment, Limiting Liability for the Negligent Infliciton of Emotional Distress: The
"Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 847, 849 (1981). The zone of danger test
did not allow recovery for emotional distress resulting from fear caused by witnessing injury
to a third person. Because recovery for emotional harm evolved from the common law of
torts, early emotional distress recovery was limited to fear of harm to one's own person. Id.
62. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
63. Id. at 302, 379 P.2d at 518, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 38; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, §313 b (1966).
1033
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held that legal duty limits liability and that the defendant's duty to
plaintiff was to be determined by a balancing of interests,"" not solely
by the foreseeability of harm to a plaintiff. 65 In the balance, prob-
lems of judicial administration outweigh the protection of the plain-
tiff's interest in mental security. 66 The Amaya court cited the dif-
ficulty of proving the causal connection between the emotional harm
and the physical harm. 67
Additional difficulties arise in developing reasonable limits to the
cause of action of a bystander for mental distress.61 The Amaya court
feared recognition of a duty to bystanders would deter socially useful
conduct. 69 The duty would require greater expenditures by the public
for insurance. 0 Limitless liability would penalize defendants far beyond
the degree of their degrees of culpability.7 The zone of danger rule
fixed the boundries for recovery of emotional distress until 1968, when
the California Supreme Court replaced the zone of danger test with
a test of reasonable foreseeability.72
C. The Dillon Rule
In 1968, the California Supreme Court abolished the zone of danger
rule in the landmark decision of Dillon v. Legg." Plaintiffs, mother
and daughter, both witnessed another daughter being hit and killed
by a car negligently driven by defendant.7 ' The witnessing daughter
was within the zone of danger and could recover for emotional distress
caused by fear for her own safety. 75 The mother, was a few yards
away, outside the "zone of danger." Therefore, recovery was denied
for the mother's cause of action. The court noted the arbitrariness
of the zone of danger rule and observed that the real source of harm
causing mental distress was not fear of personal harm, but fear of
64. See 4 B. WITKIN, SummARY or. CALIFORNtA LAW, ToRTs, §493, at 338 (8th ed. 1974).
65. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). The court held
lack of foreseeable harm to the plaintiff precluded the existence of duty. Id.
66. Amaya, 59 Cal. 2d at 310-13, 379 P.2d at 522-24, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42-44.
67. Id. at 326-27, 379 P.2d at 544, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
68. Id. at 313-15, 379 P.2d at 524, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45. The court held that a defendant
could not be held liable for the endless sequence of results that follow from a single act. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 730, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74, (overruling Amaya,
59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33).
73. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
74. Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
75. Id.
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harm to a third person.7 6 The court found that an arbitrary distance
should not preclude the mother from recovery for clearly foreseeable
emotional trauma."
The court, reversing Amaya,7 rejected the approach that a limited
legal duty precluded liability to plaintiffs outside the zone of physical
danger." The court felt the zone of danger test placed arbitrary limita-
tions on liability. The court replaced the arbitrary limitation with the
principle that the proper method of limiting liability is to hold defen-
dants amenable only for injuries reasonably foreseeable to the defen-
dant.8" Therefore, foreseeability of risk becomes the primary means
of establishing the element of duty.' The Dillon court articulated three
factors to be balanced in determining whether a defendant should
reasonably foresee injury to a bystander: (1) close proximity to the
scene of the accident, (2) contemporaneous sensory perception and
(3) a close relationship with the primary victim." Evaluation of the
factors would indicate the degree of foreseeability of emotional in-
jury to the plaintiff. The court reasoned that the problems inherent
in allowing recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress to a
bystander should be resolved by the use of general tort principles,
not by creating exceptions to them." In application, however, Dillon
has led to inconsistent results.
D. Application of Dillon
The Dillon court cautioned that the three factors were merely
guidelines to be applied on a case-by-case basis. 4 Later decisions, how-
ever, transformed the guidelines into strict requirements. 8 5 This mechan-
ical application of the Dillon factors has often producted inequitable
results. 6
76. Id. at 732-33, 441 P.2d at 916-17, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
77. Id.
78. Amaya, 59 Cal. 2d at 310, 379 P.2d at 530, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
79. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 739, 441 P.2d at 911, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
83. Id. at 746-47, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78. The Dillon dissent noted that
the Amaya court had considered all the issues presented by the plaintiff in Dillon and had
dismissed them. Additionally, the dissent argued that that the new guidelines were as arbitrary
as the previous test. The dissent felt any further adjustments to limiting or extending liability
should emanate from the legislature. Id.
84. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
85. See infra notes 91-118 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
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In Dillon the second factor, contemporaneous sensory perception,
was not an issue because the child was injured in an auto accident
within the direct view of her mother.8 7 Additionally, in many cases
brought by bystanders subsequent to Dillon, the element of a brief
and sudden occurrence was not in issue.88 A review of these deci-
sions, however, reveals that the courts have applied a mechanical test
when the accident was the result of a brief and sudden occurrence.89
In Jansen v. Children's Hospital Medical Center9' the First District
Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether a bystander, to state
a cause of action for emotional distress, must show the injury to the
primary victim was the result of a brief and sudden occurrence.
In Jansen, a mother watched the slow painful death of her daughter
in the hospital.9' After the child's death, the mother learned that the
death was the result of a failure by the doctor to diagnose a penetrating
duodenal ulcer.92 The mother sued alleging negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. Recovery for the mother's emotional trauma was
denied. 93 The court concluded that Dillon contemplated a brief and
sudden event causing injury to the child.9 ' The event must be one
subject to sensory perception.9" The allegedly negligent misdiagnosis
was not the subject of sensory perception by the mother occurring
contemporaneously with the injury to her child96 and therefore was
not within the meaning of a brief and sudden occurrence. Cases follow-
ing Jansen interpreted the mechanical approach to the Dillon factors
as an attempt to avoid "potentially infinite liability." 97
The sudden occurrence requirement was again approved by the
California Supreme Court in Justus v. Atchison.9" In Justus, a father
was present in the waiting room when his child died during birth due
to defendant's negligence.99 The father brought an action for negligent
87. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
88. Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980) (elec-
trocution); Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978) (car
accident); Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978) (drown-
ing); Archibald v. Braverman 275 Cal. App. 3d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1973) (explosion).
89. See infra notes 93-118 and accompanying text.
90. 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973).
91. Id. at 23, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 582, 565 P.2d 122, 134, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 109 (1977).
98. Id. at 582, 565 P.2d at 134, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
99. Id. at 585, 565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
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infliction of emotional distress.' 0 Recovery for the father was denied.''
The court held that since the father's shock occurred after the doctor
informed him that the baby died, the mental distress did not arise
from the observance of defendant's negligent acts.' 0 2 This result shows
the strict interpretation of "contemporaneous observance" adopted
by the court.0 3 A different interpretation, however, was taken by the
court in Austin v. Regents of the University of California.'
In Austin the Second District Court of Appeal permitted recovery
for a plaintiff father present in the delivery room. Austin was factually
similar to Justus.0 5 The court in Austin, however, held a "contem-
poraneous observation" of the event occurred since the father felt
the cessation of life with his hand. 06 The different results in Justus
and Austin demonstrate that mechanical application of the Dillon
factors produce inconsistent results. 07
Additionally, other California cases rigidly applying the Dillon
factors produced irreconcilable results. 08 In Hair v. County of
Monterey' 9 the First District Court of Appeal strictly interpreted the
Dillon factors. 10 In Hair, parents waited in the reception room dur-
ing the oral surgery on their daughter. The oral surgeon's allegedly
negligent treatment rendered the child a paraplegic."' The parents
sought recovery for damages for emotional distress arising from the
conduct of the defendant."' The court held the parents did not con-
temporaneously observe the event, and therefore, denied recovery. The
court reasoned that since the parents were in the reception room dur-
100. Id. at 586, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1979).
105. Compare Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 585, 565 P.2d at 131, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (1977)
with Austin v. Regents of University of California, 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 358, 152 Cal. Rptr.
420, 423 (1979). Both cases involved plaintiff fathers who were present in the delivery room
when their children died during birth due to the defendants' alleged negligence. In Justus, the
court denied recovery since the father's shock occurred after the doctor informed him that
the baby had just died. Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 586, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at Ill.
However, in Austin, the court permitted recovery since the father learned of the death by his
own observance. Austin, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 358, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
106. Austin, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 358, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
107. See Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 184, 703 P.2d at 18, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 678 (Bird, C.J.
dissenting and concurring).
108. Id. at 678 n.3.
109. 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975).
110. Id. at 543, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
I11. Id. at 540, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
112. Id.
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ing the oral surgery on their daughter, they only saw the resultant
injury and not the tort." 3
A different result was reached in Mobaldi v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of California.' 4 In Mobaldi, plaintiff brought her foster son to
the hospital for tests relating to a congenital kidney defect. While
plaintiff held the child, the doctors injected a glucose and dye solu-
tion into the child's arm. The dosage diagnosed by the physician was
wrong, causing the child to convulse and lapse into a coma."5 The
Mobaldi court found the facts had satisfied the Dillon requirement
that plaintiff "perceive[d] by sight and hearing the physical injury
to another in her presence caused by the defendant's negligence.""1 6
The recurring inconsistencies of cases led the Ochoa court to reject
the brief and sudden occurrence requirement developed by California
courts after Dillon.' 7 The court held that strict application of the
second Dillon factor arbitrarily limited liability." 8 The factors were
aimed at assessing whether the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of
defendant's negligence." 9 Rather than requiring a brief and sudden
occurrence, which has little bearing on the foreseeability of a plain-
tiff, the Ochoa court permitted recovery when the plaintiff observed
defendant's conduct and the child's injury. 2 ' Contemporaneous with
that observance, the plaintiff must be aware that defendant's con-
duct was causing harm to the child.' 2'
III. LEGAL RAmCATIONS
The Ochoa holding reaffirmed the Dillon guidelines, while intended
to be flexible, were also a means of guarding against unwarranted
extensions of liability.'22 This flexibiltity allows recovery whenever harm
113. The Ochoa court disapproved of Hair, holding that the parents need not be aware
of the tortious nature of defendant's action toward the child in order to recover. 39 Cal. 3d
at 167, 703 P.2d at 6, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
114. 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976).
115. Id. at 578, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
116. Id. at 577, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
117. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 168, 703 P.2d at 7, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
118. Id.
119. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74. The court stated
that the facts of Dillon did not raise the issue of whether in the absence or insignificance
of some of the other factors, the accident and injury would not be reasonably foreseeable
and therefore, defendant would owe no duty of due care to plaintiff. The court left it up
to future cases to draw the lines of demarcation upon facts more subtle than the compelling
ones alleged in the Dillon complaint. Id.
120. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 170, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
121. Id.
122. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 739, 441 P.2d at 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 72. The principle of
foreseeability serves to limit the otherwise potentially infinite liability for any negligent act. Id.
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is foreseeable to the plaintiff.'123 The Dillon limitation on unwarranted
extensions of liability would therefore be determined by defining the
duty of due care a defendant owes to a foreseeable plaintiff. This
approach of merging the principles of foreseeability of harm and the
foreseeable plaintiff had been criticized by the bench and bar.'24 The
Dillon factors, which treat foreseeability of harm as a limiting func-
tion, have often producted arbitrary results. The strict interpretation
and mechanical application of the factors often have little relation
to the principles of foreseeability espoused in Dillon.'25 In light of
these criticisms, this Note will discuss the use of Ochoa to resolve
some of the problems presented by Dillon. Potential problems include
(1) the function of the factors,'2 6 (2) the relationship of the Dillon
factors to foreseeability of harm to a bystander,'27 and (3) the suc-
cess of limiting liability.' 2
1. Function of the Dillon Factors
A potential area for confusion is the lack of direction from the
Dillon court on the function of the factors. This lack of direction
has resulted in inconsistent approaches by subsequent courts. 29 Some
courts appear to require the plaintiff to show the factors as elements
of a prima facie case in order to state a cause of action. 3 ' If the
factors are considered necessary elements of a cause of action, the
absence of any one element will result in denial of recovery.' 3 ' This
strict application, however, has excluded plaintiffs who suffered emo-
tional distress caused by defendant's negligent conduct even though
the suffering was foreseeable. 13 2
Other courts have adopted the approach that the factors are flexi-
ble weights to be balanced in order to determine whether recovery
should be allowed.' 33 The court in Dillon urged that the factors be
used to evaluate the degreee to which the accident and the harm was
123. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
124. See e.g., Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 179, 703 P.2d at 14, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (Grodin,
J. concurring); Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E. 419 at 422 (1969); Diamond, supra note 40 at 488.
125. Diamond, supra note 40 at 488-90.
126. See infra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
130. See Archibald, 275 Cal. App. 2d at 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725. The court used the
Dillon factors as elements of the cause of action and held the plaintiff had met all three and
thus was entitled to recover. Id. See also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
131. Comment, supra note 61 at 862.
132. See Diamond, supra note 40 at 447-93.
133. See Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 92021, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
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reasonably foreseeable.' 34 By applying the factors on a case-by case
basis the court could delineate the area of liability, while excluding
the remote and unexpected.
The Ochoa decision acknowledges the Dillon approach of using the
factors on a case-by-case basis.' The Ochoa court rejected the sudden
occurrence requirement as an unwarranted restriction on the
guidelines. 3 6 Instead, the court replaced the sudden occurrence re-
quirement with a more relaxed standard.'37 Therefore, under the new
standard of the Ochoa court, in order to recover for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress, Mrs. Ochoa only needed to have seen the
defendant's conduct, Rudy's injury, and, during the same period of
time, have been aware that defendant's conduct was causing harm
to Rudy.'38
While flexible guidelines have many advantages, they also present
disadvantages.' 3 9 The ultimate function of the factors is to define the
limits of liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 4 Factors
that are too flexible allow for the inclusion of subjective considera-
tions that inevitably lead to inconsistent results.'"" The altered view
by the Ochoa court of the second Dillon factor offers little to counter
the criticism of the flexibility of the factors. 'z
2. Foreseeability
The Dillon factors stress the use of foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff resulting from defendant's negligent conduct as a method
of limiting liability to a plaintiff.' 3 Under general tort principles,
a plaintiff may recover if the plaintiff show that the defendant owed
a duty to the plaintiff because harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable.'4
Under the principle of limited duty, however, recovery may be denied
even if the plaintiff is foreseeable. The denial of recovery is based
134. Id.
135. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 166, 703 P.2d at 5, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 169, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
138. Id.
139. See Note, supra note 53 at 881. Flexible guidelines in bystander recovery cases, such
as the reasonable foreseeability test, offer "little guidance to the lower courts in deterining
the ultimate issue of liability." Id.
140. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d 179, 703 P.2d 14, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75 (Grodin, J. concurring).
141. See supra notes 86-123 and accompanying text.
142. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 190, 703 P.2d at 22, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (Bird, C.J. concurr-
ing and dissenting).
143. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
144. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, §53, at 324-25.
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upon policy considerations'45 that outweigh the policy of compensating
victims of a defendant's negligence. The concept of a limited duty
previously focused on a defendant's special status'46 or special
categories of defendant's behavior.' 7 While the Dillon factors seek
to limit the duty owed to the plaintiff, the focus is on neither the
defendant's status nor the defendant's behavior. Instead, the factors
focus on the plaintiff and the fortuitous circumstances in which the
plaintiff suffered the harm.' 8 A plaintiff who meets the criteria of
the Dillon factors can recover, but of the three criteria, only one is
related to foreseeablilty of harm to the plaintiff.' 9 For example, the
requirement of plainitiff's physical proximity to the scene of the
accident has little relationship to the foreseeablility of harm. There
is no evidence to show that being closer to the accident increased
the severity of the mental trauma. A mother's emotional distress
resulting from an injury caused to her child will be just as great if
she is one mile away from the accident as opposed to one foot away.'50
The physical proximity factor functions as an arbitrary limit to
liability 5' rather than an accurate measure of a foreseeable pool of
plaintiffs to whom the defendant should owe a duty of due care.
Additionally, the requirement of sensory and contemporaneous
145. See generally, Leibson, supra note 42. Recovery is limited by public policy because
of a number of disparate beliefs: (1) the belief that the defendant cannot reasonably be expected
to foresee the injury to the plaintiff and is thus under no duty, (2) the belief that to impose
such a duty upon a defendant would expose the public to unlimited liability by allowing almost
anyone who suffers some emotional injury in connection with the incident to be a potential
plaintiff, and (3) the belief that to allow recovery would open the "floodgates of litigation"
and swamp the courts with frivolous and fraudulent claims. Id. at 167-68. Cf. Dillon at 731,
441 P.2d 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. 75. The court reasoned the possibility of fraudulent assertions
may improperly allow recovery in isolated cases, but this does not justify the wholesale rejec-
tion of an entire class of claims in which that potentiality arises. Id. at 736, 441 P.2d 920,
69 Cal. Rptr. 80.
146. "Good Samaritan" statutes, for example, are designed to encourage physicians to treat
those with a need for emergency treatment. Therefore, the liability of the doctor for negligent
medical care is restricted in "Good Samaritan" cases. Diamond, supra note 39, at 488 n.65.
147. The courts are reluctant to impose an affirmative duty to rescue in the absence of
a special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff. See W. PROSSER, supra note
4 §56, at 338-50.
148. The plaintiff who is outside the foreseeable zone of physical injury but within the
foreseeable zone of psychological injury can recover only if the Dillon factors are interpreted
rigidly. See Diamond, supra, note 40, at 488.
149. The requirement of a close relationship between the victim and the bystander plaintiff
is clearly relevant to foreseeability. Diamond, supra note 40, at 488.
150. See Leibson, supra note 43, at 166-68. See also Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 184, 703 P.2d
at 18, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 678. (Bird, C.J. dissenting). "Why should the parents in Hathaway
... . who arrived on the scene moments after the crucial event, (be) denied recovery, when
the parents in Nazaroff and Archibald, who also arrived moments after the accident, have
been permitted recovery?" Id.
151. Diamond, supra note 39, at 489.
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perception or temporal proximity has little relationship to the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.'52 For example, the foreseeability
of distress to a mother is the same whether the distress is caused by
perceiving the results of defendant's negligent behavior or shock arising
from the perception of the impact to her child. The only factor con-
sistent with foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff is close relation-
ship or relational proximity.'53
The Ochoa court extended liability to situations in which plaintiff
is aware that defendant's conduct caused injury to a child and
perceived, first hand, both the defendant's conduct and the child's
injury." ' That extension, however, does not create any greater cor-
relation with the foreseeability of harm analysis than the previous
sudden occurrence factor. The shock arising from perception of defen-
dant's conduct and the child's injury caused by that conduct is no
more foreseeable than the shock that would have resulted if Mrs.
Ochoa had been told of her son's illness and death the day Rudy
died.'"
3. Limitation on Liability
Historically, limiting liability for negligent infliction of mental distress
to bystanders has been a major concern of the courts.'56 Emotional
distress is thought too subtle and speculative to be capable of measure-
ment, creating difficulty in measuring damages.' 57 Fears of fraudulent
claims created further barriers to liability for mental distress.' Modern
developments in medicine and psychiatry have reduced the possibility
of fraudulent claims.' 9 The need to limit liability, however, remains
152. Compare Nazaroff, 80 Cal. App. 3d at 562, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 657, with Hathaway,
112 Cal. App. 3d at 736, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 435. The Nazaroff court took a more flexible
view of the Dillon guidelines, permitting recovery where the mother saw her son pulled from
the swimming pool but had not seen the child while he was drowning. "Dillon created [not]
parameters but merely guidelines." Id. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 562. In Hathaway, using a strict
application of the Dillon factors, the court permitted no recovery where a mother arrived on
the scene to find her son dying of electrocution. The court held that she did not "sensorily
perceive the injury-causing event.... the actual contact between the electrically charged water
cooler and [the child], but only saw the results of the contact." Id. 112 Cal. App. 3d at 736.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
154. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 170, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
155. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. J. FLEMING, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS, 51 (1967). See also Prossor, Insult
and Outrage 44 CAL. L. REv. 40, 41 (1956).
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a prime concern of the courts.' 61 Society can not redress all harms.' 6'
Additionally, the entire scope of human activity would be unreasonably
burdened if no limits were placed on liability.'
62
The Dillon court, focusing on foreseeability, expected the three
factors to act as a screening device to limit liability.' 63 Conflicts arise,
however, when the factors are applied flexibly to allow recovery for
reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs while at the same time those factors
are used to limit the defendant's liability to the otherwise foreseeable
plaintiff. Sensing the conflict, many post-Dillon courts opted for the
mechanical application of the factors based on policy concerns war-
ranting limitations on liability.' 64 Although foreseeability may be ef-
fective in determining liability, the use of foreseeability renders the
Dillon factors ineffective as a limit to liability.' 65 A pure foreseeability
standard under traditional tort principles focuses on the foreseeability
of harm to others.' 66 The limit of liability for harm caused is based
upon limiting potential plaintiffs to those who will be foreseeably harm-
ed as a result of defendant's negligent conduct.' 6 The Ochoa rejec-
tion of the brief and sudden occurrence standard did not necessarily
resolve the difficulties produced by the Dillon court.' 6 The Califor-
nia policy decision to limit liability will most likely be achieved by
a narrow application of the factors.' 69
CONCLUSION
The rejection by the California Supreme Court of the brief and
sudden occurrence requirement of Dillon is justified by case law and
sound public policy.' 7 The Dillon factors were intended as guidelines
based upon the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.'' The factors
160. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
161. Amaya, 59 Cal. 2d at 314-15, 379 P.2d at 319-20, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43. See supra note
66 and accompanying text.
162. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, §54 at 334.
163. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 84-121 and accompanying text. These cases demonstrate that the inflexible
approach has presented several problems. Id.
165. Id.
166. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, §43 at 267.
167. Id.
168. Othoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 178, 703 P.2d at 14, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 674. Justice Grodin
agreed with Chief Justice Bird that many unanswered questions remain concerning the scope
of the Dillon guidelines. Id.
169. Unless the factors are closely related to foreseeability of harm to a plaintiff, the factors
will be used mechanically, causing arbitrary results. See Diamond, supra note 39, at 478.
170. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 181, 703 P.2d at 16, 216 Cal. Rptr: at 676, (Bird, C.J. concurr-
ing and dissenting).
171. See supra notes 84-118 and accompanying text.
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are flawed, however, and in practice have been applied mechanically
with arbitrary results."' They provide little guidance to lower courts.
The Ochoa court recognized the flaws caused by mechanical applica-
tion of the factors. 173 The court attempted to remedy the problems
by liberalizing the requirements necessary to state a cause of action
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Ochoa court did
little, however, to resolve the numerous questions concerning applica-
tion of those guidelines.
Sharon Clyde Dutton
1044
172. See Diamond, supra note 39, at 478-80.
173. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 168, 703 P.2d at 7, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 667. Arbitrary restrictions
on liability when shock to a plaintiff is highly foreseeable unduly frustrates the goal of
compensation. Id.
